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Abstract. With our increasing dependency on computer-based systems,
ensuring their dependability becomes one the most important concerns
during system development. This is especially true for mission- and
safety-critical systems. Critical systems typically use fault tolerance mech-
anisms to mitigate runtime errors. However, fault tolerance modelling
and, in particular, rigorous definitions of fault tolerance requirements,
fault assumptions and system recovery have not been given enough at-
tention during formal system development. This paper proposes a devel-
opment method for stepwise modelling of high-level system fault tolerant
behaviour. The method provides an environment for explicit modelling
of fault tolerance and modal aspects of system behaviour and is sup-
ported by tools that are smoothly integrated into an industry-strength
development environment. A case study from the aerospace domain is
used to demonstrate the proposed method.
Keywords: Dependability, fault tolerance, formal methods, refinement,
patterns, multi-view development
1 Introduction
Our society is becoming increasingly dependent on computer-based systems due
to the falling costs and improving capabilities of computers. There is a class of
systems called critical that operate with resources of the highest value. Defects
in such systems can have a significant impact on the environment, assets, and
human life. Critical systems have to be dependable [4], so that they can be
justifiably trusted to provide the required services.
One of the prominent solutions to ensuring systems dependability by fault
prevention and/or fault removal is the inclusion of formal modelling in various
stages of the software development process. Usage of formal methods in develop-
ment of dependable systems is increasing and is proven to be cost-effective [12].
Among the main current obstacles to adopting formal methods by industry are
the lack of tools and engineers’ experience in formal development. We believe this
situation can be significantly improved by teaching best practices of modelling
and providing modelling guidelines and reusable solutions.
It is well-known that one cannot produce a faultless system functioning in a
perfect fault-free environment [9]. While it is theoretically possible to formally
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produce a system free of bugs, developers cannot assume system environment to
be fault-free. A number of safety and reliability analysis techniques are being suc-
cessfully used nowadays in industry such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis, and HiP-HOPS. Deterioration of physical com-
ponents makes it necessary for systems to employ fault tolerance mechanisms [9]
in both hardware and software. Systems need to survive low-level sensor and
actuator failures to provide acceptable levels of dependability properties.
There are a number of studies on formal modelling of fault tolerance. Some
research is done on extending original semantics of formal methods with addi-
tional fault tolerance modelling constructs. Other techniques provide patterns
and modelling styles for modelling fault tolerance within the formal semantics of
a particular formalism. For example, [8] provides a guidance to modelling fault
tolerant control system in the B formalism. The authors focus on modelling
low-level component failures that may be masked at a system level. Another
example of a style-based approach is introduced in [7]. The authors propose a
style for modelling systems with a layered architecture using an exception prop-
agation mechanism. The style implies operational ”execution” of a model, and
thus makes it difficult to specify and verify system-level safety properties.
We follow a pattern-based approach and propose a method for modelling
high-level fault tolerant system behaviour in the Event-B formalism [3]. The
method offers a refinement strategy for modelling with Event-B, and a num-
ber of modelling patterns to assist in development of fault tolerant systems. The
method uses an additional viewpoint called Fault Tolerance (FT) Views for mod-
elling modal and fault tolerant behaviour. In contrast to the above-mentioned
studies, we focus on reactive models of system-level fault tolerant behaviour, and
provide support for explicit reasoning about safety properties.
The paper is organised as follows. We give a brief introduction into the Event-
B method in Section 2. The FT Views language is introduced in Section 3. We
introduce the method, its main principles, a refinement strategy, and the most
important refinement patterns in Section 4. We demonstrate method application
in Section 5. Section 6 summarises the work and draws conclusions.
2 Event-B
The development method described in this thesis is exemplified on Event-B
formal method [3]. Event-B is a state-based formalism closely related to Classical
B and Action Systems. The Event-B development is stepwise: the basic idea
is to design the system implementation gradually, by a number of correctness
preserving steps called refinements.
The basic unit of Event-B specification is called a machine. A machine en-
capsulates a local state (program variables v) and provides operations on the
state. The operations (called events) can be defined as
ANY p WHERE H(v) THEN S(v, v′) END
where p is a list of local variables (parameters), the guard H(v) is a state pred-
icate, and the action S(v, v′) is a statement (assignment) describing how the
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system state is affected by the event. The occurrence of events represents the
observable behaviour of the system. When the condition WHERE is satisfied,
an event is enabled and its action can be executed. The action S(v, v′) can be
either a deterministic or a non-deterministic assignment.
The INVARIANT clause of the machine contains the properties of the
system (expressed as state predicates I(v)) that should be preserved during
system execution. The data types and constants needed for specification of the
system are defined in a separate component called Context.
To check consistency of an Event-B machine, we need to verify two types of
properties: event feasibility and invariant preservation. Formally,
I(v) ∧H(v)⇒ ∃v′ · S(v, v′)
I(v) ∧H(v) ∧ S(v, v′)⇒ I(v′)
The main development methodology of Event-B is refinement – the process
of transforming an abstract specification to gradually introduce implementation
details while preserving its correctness. Refinement allows us to reduce non-
determinism present in an abstract model. For a refinement step to be valid, ev-
ery possible execution of the refined machine must correspond to some execution
of the abstract machine. To demonstrate that each event is a correct refinement
of its abstract counterpart, we need to prove that the guard is strengthened in
the refinement, and also demonstrate a correspondence between the abstract and
concrete postconditions. Formally,
I(v) ∧ I ′(v, w) ∧H ′(w)⇒ H(v)
I(v) ∧ I ′(v, w) ∧H ′(w) ∧ S′(w,w′)⇒ ∃v′ · S(v, v′) ∧ I ′(v′, w′)
where the primed expressions H ′, I ′, S′ belong to the refined model. The ma-
chines linked with each other by refinement form a development chain, or in a
more general case development represents a tree.
The consistency of Event-B models as well as correctness of refinement steps
should be formally demonstrated by discharging proof obligations. The Rodin
platform[1], a tool supporting Event-B, automatically generates the required
proof obligations and attempts to automatically prove them. Sometimes it re-
quires user assistance by invoking its interactive prover. However, in general the
tool achieves high level of automation in proving (usually over 90%).
3 Fault Tolerance Views
The Fault Tolerance Views [10] (also called Modal Views) is a modelling en-
vironment for describing modal and fault tolerance aspects of a system in a
concise manner while formally linking them to the main model. Much of the
formal foundations of Fault Tolerance Views are based on the previous work on
modelling modal systems [5].
A modal view is a graph diagram developed alongside an Event-B model.
The two basic building blocks of a modal view are mode and transition. Mode is
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a general characterisation of a system behaviour. It describes the functionality
of a system and the operating conditions under which the system provides this
functionality. A system switches from one mode to another through a mode
transition. A transition can be given additional meaning in the context of fault
tolerance: there are error and recovery transition types which are specialisations
of the normal type. Relative to the transition and its type, we differentiate the
fault tolerance types of modes: we say that an error originates in a normal mode
and leads to switching to a degraded mode or a recovery mode. The recovery
transition leads from the recovery mode back to normal.
A view is linked with a formal model and ensures that the model implements
the features described in the view. For that, modes and transitions are mapped
into groups of events. A mode is characterised by a pair of predicates A/G where:
– A(v) is a mode assumption, a predicate over the current system state. By
assumption we denote different operating conditions.
– G(v, v′) is a mode guarantee, a relation over the current and next states of
the system. By guarantee we denote the functionality ensured by the system
under the corresponding assumption.
With assumption and guarantee of a mode being predicates expressed on the
variables of a model, we are able to impose restrictions on the way modes and
transitions are mapped into model events and thus cross-check design decisions
in either part. A view must satisfy internal consistency conditions, such as mode
feasibility and invariant preservation, as well as consistency with the formal
model. For example, the following condition applied to an event requires that
the event of a mode must satisfy the mode guarantee G(v) and reestablish the
assumption A(v):
I(v) ∧A(v) ∧H(v) ∧ S(v, v′) =⇒
[G(v, v′) ∧A(v′)] ∨ [¬A(v′) ∧ (A1(v′) ∨ ...An(v′))]
If the same event is used for outgoing transitions it must satisfy the assumptions
of one of the target modes A1(v
′)...An(v′) and invalidate the source assumption.
Diagrams are built in a step-wise manner, starting from the most primitive
and introducing details using our modal refinement process [10]. A Modal Views
development comprises a chain of documents similar to the Event-B develop-
ment. Modal views are built by incrementally refining modes, errors and recov-
eries and proving the refinement relation between each two consequent views.
Views and Event-B models describe the same system and are refined in parallel.
The tool support for the Modal Views is a plug-in [2] to the Rodin Platform
providing a diagram editor, a static checker, and a proof obligation generator.
The full list of verification conditions (proof obligations) and details on the
meaning and purpose may be found in [2, 5, 10].
4 Development Method
In this section, we describe a method for top-down development of fault tolerant
systems with a focus on abstract levels of modelling. The method addresses a
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number of issues of the state-of-the-art approaches and is designed to fill the
existing gap in modelling and verification of abstract fault tolerant behaviour.
The development method includes the following three constituents:
– the modelling principles stating the key points for modelling fault tolerant
systems in refinement-based methods,
– the refinement strategy defining a sequence of refinement steps that need to
be performed to arrive at a meaningful model of a fault tolerant system, and
– a set of modelling patterns and FT view templates that provide a reuse
mechanism during modelling.
The three constituents together represent modelling guidelines for building fault
tolerant systems in refinement-based formal methods in a systematic way. Al-
though the method does not require the usage of the Modal Views, it greatly
benefits from additional formal constraints provided by the views. Thus, we de-
scribe the application of the Modal Views as a part of the method.
The method is designed for modelling reactive and control systems as labelled
transition systems. It specifies particular steps that need to be performed over
the state transition system to adequately represent the system environment and
correctly model the system fault tolerant behaviour. The guidelines proposed in
this chapter can be applied during modelling in any state-based formal method
with interleaving semantics such as Action Systems, B, Event-B, Z, and VDM.
The method is exemplified on the Event-B formalism.
4.1 Assumptions and Principles
The development method is based on a number of assumptions and principles.
Our first assumption is that the system requirements were elicited prior to mod-
elling. We also assume that the purpose of formal modelling is to specify imple-
mentable system behaviour satisfying the desired properties described in require-
ments. To satisfy the purpose, properties must be expressed in the model. These
can be safety properties expressed as invariants and proved by a theorem prover
or liveness properties verified by a model checker. The additional viewpoint as
described in Section 3 serves as a source of diagrammatically represented prop-
erties that otherwise could be difficult to express in the model, or can be missed.
The modal views complement the correctness criterion for the models.
The method facilitates the expression of safety properties by providing pat-
terns that follow a reactive style of modelling. By the reactive modelling style we
mean such a way of behaviour definition that uses atomic reactions and allows
developers to express high-level properties in a form cause⇒ reaction.
One of the most important principles used in the method is the principle of
behaviour restriction. We treat the system model as a transition system that is
”composed” of two parts: an unconstrained behaviour and a set of functional
and fault tolerance constraints. An unconstrained behaviour contains all system
states and all transitions, it is merely a declaration of the system structure using
variables. A model without constraints has a non-deterministic behaviour as it
can go from any state to any other state. The development departs from an
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unconstrained declaration of the state space and step-wise arrives at a model
which ”behaves” in a safe and sensible manner within the given constraints, i.e.
requirements.
Another important principle is the need for an adequate model of the system
environment. This principle is induced by semantic gaps between the state-based
formalisms for modelling the system logic and conventionally used languages for
expressing the system environment (e.g. physical processes). This leads to a re-
quirement for the developer: he/she must understand the nature of the variables
in the model, and their future implementation in the real system.
In our method, we assume that a system observes some part of its environ-
ment and reacts to its changes. All state transitions that occur during system
execution need to satisfy the implementable causality rule: a cause (environmen-
tal change) must not depend on a reaction (system change). In other words, a
system being in a certain state may not ”forbid” environment to change. Other-
wise, the model would contain unrealistic assumptions about system environment
that cannot be implemented.
Closely related to unimplementable assumptions are faults and the resulting
errors which are inevitable phenomena of the final systems [9]. To adequately
model them, we state the following as a separate error modelling principle: errors
must be abstractly modelled from the early modelling steps where functionality
depends on the environmental conditions.
In order to abstractly model system-level errors, developers need to know
possible low-level errors and account for them at higher levels of behaviour spec-
ification. Therefore, one needs to plan ahead and construct an abstract model
knowing possible and acceptable solutions of low-level modelling. This is the
essence of refinement planning. The method described in this work facilitates
such planning by providing a refinement strategy and a number of modelling
patterns that support decision making.
4.2 Refinement Strategy
The development method prescribes a number of steps that need to be per-
formed to arrive at a correct and meaningful model of a fault tolerant system.
At each step, certain development actions are taken such as editing or refining
a system state model or refining a modal view. The schematic procedure of the
development method is shown on Figure 1. The development method is divided
into two parts: the first part contains steps for a generic development of reactive
fault tolerant systems and is applicable in any problem domain, the second part,
that follows the first one, focuses on control systems and facilitates modelling of
low-level components with an intention to support the implementation step.
Abstract modelling of a reactive fault tolerant system starts with defining a
failure-free functionality of the system (Step 1). By failure-free functionality we
mean the abstract behaviour that is only restricted by functional requirements.
At the first abstract level where fault tolerance requirements impact the
system model, a designer has to choose an abstract fault tolerance class of the
system (Step 2). We give more details on system FT classes in Section 4.3.
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Failure-free
functionality
Abstract FT classes
failure-free / safe stop
Refinement
of functionality
FT component refinement
Hardware
Control cycle
Part 1:
Reactive system
abstract modelling
Part 2:
Control system modelling
Requirements
Implementation
Step 2
Step 1
Step 3
Step 4
Step 6
Step 7
Behaviour restrictionStep 5
Fig. 1: The steps of the method
Steps 3, 4 and 5 are repeated iteratively until all the required properties of
the reactive system behaviour are expressed and verified. Step 3 is refinement
of functionality which is project-specific. Step 4 is called the fault tolerant com-
ponent refinement : it refines the abstract component errors and FT behaviour
into sub-component errors. This is described in Section 4.4. Step 5 is the be-
haviour restriction step that is used to strengthen the functional behaviour with
operational conditions which is described in Section 4.5.
The second part of the method refines the reactive model into a model of a
control system. The two steps performed are inclusion of low-level hardware units
(sensors and actuators) and realisation of a control cycle. We briefly describe the
modelling of control systems in Section 4.6.
4.3 Abstract System Fault Tolerance Classes
According to the proposed method, the first decision a developer has to make
is to choose an abstract fault tolerance class of a system. We identify two ab-
stract classes of systems from the fault tolerance modelling perspective: a class
of failure-free systems, and a class of safe stop systems. Any system belongs to
one of these classes depending on whether stop conditions are defined in require-
ments. The two classes of system fault tolerance are associated with two possible
initial modal views accordingly (Figure 2).
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Systems of the first class can mask all internal errors and operate indefinitely
long. Abstract models of such systems shall contain functional behaviour under
ideal environmental conditions. This is represented by a single mode Normal on
Figure 2. The mode only represents the ”normal” behaviour at the abstract level
and can be refined into recoveries and/or graceful degradation at later steps.
Systems of the second class cannot tolerate certain errors and can eventually
stop. The errors that can cause a system stop are called unrecoverable. In this
work, we focus on safe stop systems and do not model consequences of system
failure. If the safe stop abstraction is chosen for the system, the modeller has to
apply the safe stop pattern to the system abstract model:
Define a single variable representing the operational state of the system
(stopped). One of its values shall represent the stopped state (e.g., stopped =
TRUE). Separate the functional behaviour from the stopped state by using
the declared variable. Define a transition that switches the system to the
stopped state.
The pattern explicitly separates the operational system behaviour from the
stopped state. On the modal view, the two are represented by modes Normal
and Stop correspondingly. The stop transition depicts an abstraction of unre-
coverable errors. The actual errors will refine this transition during subsequent
refinement steps.
Normal Stop
A: stopped=FALSE
G: stopped'=FALSE
Events: <all functional events>
A: stopped=TRUE
G: stopped'=TRUE
Events: stopped
Normal
A: FALSE
G: TRUE
Events: <all functional events>
Fig. 2: Two abstract classes of fault tolerant systems
The purpose of this step is to ”reserve” an abstract representation of the
overall system fault tolerant behaviour for further refinements.
4.4 Fault Tolerant Component Refinement
Fault tolerant component is a structural system unit that is described by its
functional and error states. For example, a door can be in a functional state of
being open or closed, and in an error state of being operational or broken. In
this work, we represent the fault tolerant system under development as a layered
hierarchy of fault tolerant (FT) components. Each layer represents a level of
abstraction with the system being the root of the hierarchy. The method traverses
the hierarchy starting from its root by modelling component functional and error
states at each layer. At each step, the set of FT components is decomposed into
its FT subcomponents and the system behaviour is refined in terms of finer-
grained FT components.
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The fault tolerant component refinement step consists in applying three pat-
terns. The first pattern to be applied is the error state variable pattern:
For each component, specify a variable depicting the error state of the
component at the current abstraction level.
The safe stop pattern described in Section 4.3 is a special case of the error state
variable pattern. At the abstract level, the whole system is considered as a single
FT component and its error state is represented by a single boolean variable.
Each two subsequent layers of FT components should be formally connected
by applying the error state invariant pattern:
Define a relation between the concrete and abstract error states. The
relation can include functional states.
The error states are used in definition of fault tolerant behaviour using the
fault tolerant behaviour pattern:
All error detection transitions must refine the corresponding reaction
transitions of the system. All relevant functional states have to be covered
by outgoing error detection transitions to satisfy the causality principle.
Thus, error detection transitions are also system reactions: they change FT com-
ponents’ error states as well as functional states. Such behaviour conforms to
the reactive style of modelling and allows us to express safety properties which
include both functional and error states.
The refinement of system fault tolerant behaviour in the state model is ac-
companied by a refinement of the modal view. The refinement of modes involves
both the functional and fault tolerant system behaviour and the exact way of
modal refinement is project-specific. To assist in construction of modal views,
we offer two templates for modal refinement.
Normal Recovery
abstract_error
Normal
Recovery1
concrete_error1
Recovery2concrete_error2
Fig. 3: Error split template
Mode A Mode B
Mode A
Mode B2
Mode B1
Fig. 4: Behavioural split template
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The first template refines an abstract error with two or more concrete errors.
The process may be repeated and the result is a family of errors derived from a
single abstract error. The template is shown on Figure 3 with errors leading to
recovery modes, however, they can be applied to degraded modes as well.
The second template is a behavioural template (Figure 4), it splits a system
mode into a chain of two (or possibly more) consecutive modes. This template
can be used to model intermediate operations that the system needs to perform
to arrive at a supposedly stable mode. A particular application of the behavioural
template can be used for specifying the system graceful degradation.
4.5 Behaviour Restriction
During the behaviour restriction step, refined FT component error states and
modal views are used to restrict the system functional behaviour. When applied
to the model, the step implements those fault tolerance requirements that de-
fine the changes in system behaviour under different operating conditions. To
restrict the functional behaviour, we apply the behaviour restriction pattern to
the system model:
Restrict the functional transitions that are not allowed with respect to
the error state variables defined earlier: use the error state variables to
strengthen the domain restriction predicates of functional transitions.
Under different operational conditions, system functionality may provide dif-
ferent functions. For example, safety requirements might only permit a partial
operation of certain components after errors have been detected. Moreover, fault
tolerance requirements may contain specifications of different system behaviours
under different operational conditions, e.g., graceful degradation. The behaviour
restriction pattern ensures that the behavioural model satisfies such types of
requirements by disallowing functional transitions that are not valid.
The pattern should be used together with modal refinement. The modal views
provide consistency conditions that can be used to identify invalid functional
transitions. Restriction predicates of relevant transitions are being strengthened
using this pattern to satisfy the associated modal views.
We regard the assumption predicate (introduced in Section 3) as an abstrac-
tion of the system environment that should refer to error state variables. The
assumptions therefore state the combinations of available components that allow
the system to provide its subsets of functionality. The subsets of functionality
should refer to the logical state variables and are contained in the guarantee
predicates. A modal view specified in such way can be treated as a specification
of the system fault tolerant behaviour.
4.6 Modelling Control Systems
The component refinement and the behaviour restriction steps are performed in
a top-down manner until the reactive model of the system contains the required
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safety properties. At this step, we refine the reactive model to include hardware
units such as sensors and actuators, and extend it with a sequential control cycle.
To model hardware units, we apply the fault tolerant component refinement
step to the lowest level of abstraction and define error states and error transitions
for hardware units such as sensors and actuators.
At the final step, we extend the previously developed reactive system with a
sequential control cycle using the control cycle pattern:
Define a variable depicting the current phase of a control cycle iteration.
The control cycle consists of four phases:
1. Sensing phase: the system non-deterministically reads the sensor values.
2. Error detection phase: the system uses the new sensor readings and
expected values from previous iteration to detect deviations and low-
level errors.
3. Control phase contains the control algorithm, i.e. the reactive model
of the system that was developed previously. The control part of the
model is fed with low-level errors detected during the previous phase,
and produces new functional component states and a set of signals for
the actuators.
4. Prediction phase: the new states and the actuator signals are used at
the final phase to predict the sensor readings at the next iteration of the
cycle.
The reactive part of the system takes place of a control algorithm step of the
cycle. Sequential decomposition of the reactive model is a part of implementa-
tion: the step does not help to specify what the system does but it specifies how
the system operates. The control cycle step is partly derived from our previous
work on incorporating FMEA into Event-B specifications [11]. The control cycle
pattern described in this section can accommodate the outcomes of the FMEA
analysis, and thus the results of [11] can be reused for this work.
This step finalises the modelling and provides placeholders in the model for
further implementation.
5 Case Study
In this section, we demonstrate an application of the reactive-style steps of the
proposed method to modelling the Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS).
This case study was extensively used in the FP7 DEPLOY project [6]. The
AOCS is a generic component of a satellite onboard software the main function
of which is ensuring the desired attitude and the orbit of a satellite. In our case
study, the AOCS is equipped with three hardware units: the Earth sensor (ES),
the GPS sensor, and the payload instrument (PLI). The system functions by
switching through a sequence of modes (Off → Nominal → Science) where
each mode requires a certain configuration of units. The ultimate goal is to stay
in the Science mode and collect data with the PLI unit. To tolerate hardware
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failures, every unit of the system has a spare unit, and upon detecting an error
the system must reconfigure itself to either use a spare unit if it is available or
switch to a mode that does not use the failed units, i.e. degrade gracefully.
We follow the refinement strategy described in Section 4.2 and start with an
abstract model (M0) of system failure-free functionality. We define two events for
each of the system units: event unit work corresponds to a particular unit oper-
ation, and unit switch represents the switch of the unit between its functional
states (e.g., on/off for the ES unit).
The AOCS is a safe stop system: it can safely stop its operation when it
cannot provide the required service. Such situation can arise when the units
required for the first functional mode (Nominal) are not available. At M1 we
apply the safe stop step described in Section 4.3. We extend the Event-B model
according to the safe stop pattern, and the modal view follows the safe stop
template and contains two modes: Normal and Stop.
The next step (M2) contains functional refinement: we introduce mode switch-
ing functionality and restrict unit operation to certain modes. We represent
the current system mode by a variable mode and define three new events that
change its value: events goAdvance and downgrade initiate the reconfigura-
tion process towards a ”higher” and a ”lower” mode correspondingly, and event
reconfF inish finalises reconfiguration. The modal view of this step is shown on
Figure 5. We refine the Normal mode from M1 into the three functional modes.
We define the mode assumptions and guarantees using the variable mode, and
formally prove that the model satisfies the view.
At M2 the units operation is unrestricted: units can work and switch re-
gardless of the current system mode. At the step M3 we refine the reconfigura-
tion process and restrict the units operation to relevant modes. We refine event
reconfF inish to only finalise the reconfiguration process when all units are in
the states required by the target mode. Reconfiguration consists in switching
the units to those states, and we restrict events unit switch to only act during
reconfiguration to appropriate modes (e.g., the PLI unit can only be switched
on for the Science mode). We also restrict the work events to fire in relevant
modes. We apply the behavioural split template to the modal view of M2 and
obtain a modal view M3 shown on Figure 6. Each of the functional modes is split
into two modes: the first mode represents functionality during reconfiguration
(e.g. mode toNominal), the second mode is the stable mode when all required
units are in operation(e.g. mode Nominal). We redefine the mode guarantees in
terms of unit states. For example, the guarantee of mode Nominal is now:
unitES′ = UNIT ON ∧ unitGPS′ =GPS COARSE
∧ unitPLI ′ = UNIT OFF
At the next step M4 we refine the fault tolerant behaviour of the system and
restrict its functional behaviour (Snippet 1). This corresponds to the method
steps described in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. The abstract fault tolerant behaviour
is represented by the variable stopped from M1 which depicts the system error
state (operational/stopped). We apply the error state variable pattern and define
error states of units. For each unit, we define an integer variable representing the
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Fig. 5: Modal view M2
Off
Science
Nominal
Stop
ReboottoNominal
toScience
Fig. 6: Modal view M3
invariants
inv ES cond: unitES cond ∈ {0, 1, 2}
inv glue: stopped = TRUE⇔
unitES cond = 0 ∨
unitGPS cond = 0
events
event ES break =̂ refines stop
when
grd1: unitES cond = 1
grd2: unitES = UNIT ON
grd3: unitGPS cond > 0
then
act1: unitES cond := 0
act2: stopped := TRUE
end
event ES downgrade =̂ refines
downgrade
when
grd1: mode > OFF
grd2: unitES = UNIT ON
grd3: unitES cond = 2
grd4: unitGPS cond > 0
with
newMode: newMode = OFF
then
act1: mode := OFF
act2: stable := FALSE
act3: unitES cond := 1
end
event ES work =̂ extends ES work
when
grd3 0: unitES cond > 0
end
Snippet 1: Fault tolerant component refinement at M4
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number of available units of that type (e.g. unitES cond on the snippet). We
apply the error state invariant pattern and define a relation inv glue between
abstract stopped state and unit availability variables.
At the abstract level, system reaction is represented by event stop that stops
the system, and event downgrade that starts a reconfiguration to a ”lower”
mode. We define the error detection events as refinements of one of the appro-
priate reactions according to fault tolerant behaviour pattern. For example, event
ES downgrade may fire when an ES unit error is detected and there is a spare
unit available. The system then downgrades and enables the spare unit. Event
ES brake represents a situation when the last ES unit fails and the system stops.
We apply the behaviour restriction pattern and strengthen the guards of
functional events to satisfy the current error state. As shown on the snippet, the
ES unit can only operate (this is represented by event ES work) when there
is at least one such unit available. The modal view of the system is changed
accordingly: although there are no new modes or transitions on the view, the
assumptions of the existing modes are redefined in terms of unit error states.
For example, the assumption of mode Nominal is now as follows:
mode =NOMINAL ∧ stable = TRUE
∧ unitES cond > 0 ∧ unitGPS cond > 0
This step finalises the development of the AOCS. It can be shown that the
control cycle pattern is also applicable to the system, we omit the step due to
space restriction. The full Rodin project containing the models and views can be
downloaded from the Modal Views wiki page [2]. The refinement chain consists of
5 Event-B machines and 4 associated modal views; overall 381 proof obligations
were proven, 359 of them automatically.
6 Conclusions
Development of correct fault tolerance is a major challenge in designing complex
dependable systems as evidenced by major failures such as the crash of the
Ariane 5 launcher and the August 2003 Blackout in the US and Canada. Analysis
of these and more recent failures shows that a (typically substantial) support for
tolerating faults in many modern systems often fails or has a lower quality than
the rest of the systems. In this paper, we described a top-down development
method for formal modelling of fault tolerant systems focusing on high levels of
abstraction. The method allows developers to refine the abstract fault tolerant
systems into control systems. The method facilitates modelling fault tolerance
formally starting from the early stages of development. The early consideration
of fault tolerance in refinement-based methods can reduce the modelling efforts,
and helps to ensure the overall dependability of the resulting systems.
The method proposed incorporates a separate viewpoint for modelling modal
and fault tolerance features of systems. This viewpoint adds rigour to the formal
development process, contributes to readability of formal models by engineers,
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and bridges the gap between requirements and formal models. The method en-
sures the reuse of formal modelling by supporting patterns typical for modelling
fault tolerance.
The method is tool supported. The modal viewpoint is implemented as a
plug-in for the Rodin environment which includes a diagram editor and a smooth
integration with prover facilities [2].
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